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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to identify the sources of Russian influence in the Western Balkans.
The most influential tool of the Russian Federation is the information warfare, composed with
hybrid tactics, attempting to set a foot in the Western Balkans. Qualitative methods were used
for analysis and the findings. The main results indicate that Russia has divers’ methods to impact
political developments in the Balkans. Russia has been interested in this part of Europe, and it
engages with all interested sides in the region.
With its state propaganda, Russia at least has the ability to divert the policies of the Western
Balkan states towards the EU. Moscow prefers the status of neutrality of the countries that
emerged from the Yugoslav Federation. In other words, Kremlin challenges the U.S. on some levels
and the sources of Russian influence primarily are stemming from information warfare strategies
integrated in different platforms.
Recently the EU and the U.S. have expressed their concerns on several occasions over the
direction of democracy in the Balkans. Indeed, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, and
North Macedonia remain on the edge of Russia’s ‘sharp knife’ which has the purpose of reversing
the reforms and imposing the set of regulations which favors Kremlin in the Balkans. As the paper
indicates, Russia uses domestic and international news outlets as propaganda to reach the
nations in the region to win hearts and minds of the people against the Western approach to
some extent. Therefore, the tendency of Russian propaganda remains a threat for the Western
Balkans fragile societies. Russian strategic investments are primarily in the energy infrastructure,
the oil market and the news outlet organizations around the region.
However, Russia keeps her hands open and engages with Serbia via the news organizations
such as ‘Sputink Serbija’ and it utilizes Belgrade as a geopolitical tool to stir the unrest in Northern
Kosovo. Russia and Serbia have good strategic relations which makes Russia a great power in the
Balkans and as a key player. We conclude that the Balkans remain a flashpoint for regional actors
and non-state actors. The Balkan states must continue the path of reforms as the only way to
achieve peace and prosperity. But as paper emphasizes, Russia will continue to play crucial role
in all events of the Balkan politics due to the power of Russian Federation in international politics.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Russia has been a global power in international relations since the 17th century when Peter the
Great and later Catherine the Great raised Russia's geopolitical status internationally. At the
present time, especially after 2000, with the coming to power of President Vladimir Putin, Russia
has become more aggressive and antagonistic on a regional scale, including in the Western
Balkans. Russia uses all means and resources to meet the national objectives related to the
strategy for influence in the former spheres of influence. Therefore, Russia's silent return to the
region is not accidental and is aimed at upsetting the political, economic, ethnic and cultural
balances in the Balkans in the long run. Since 2008 the Russian Federation at some point achieved
several objectives to push back the Balkan democracies towards reforms and European
integration (Dursun, 2019: 124). While the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina demands a
comprehensive reform of its functioning or ethnic division, Kosovo urges Washington and
Brussels not to make territory and sovereignty part of the new Serbia-Kosovo agreement. The
"Balkan Initiative" is going together with the other “Three Seas Initiative" (3SI) to prevent
Russian-Chinese influence in Central and Southeast Europe, while Russia with hybrid methods
has freely created a significant advantage in the Balkans (Bardos, 2017: 9). The strongest Russian
tool is disinformation and intelligence services in the Balkans. The reforms of transition to
democracy and market economy initiated by the Washington Consensus after the fall of
communism have lagged behind in the Western Balkans and they have yet to undergo
transformation towards the EU (Matoshi & Mulaj, 2019: 180). Moreover, transition and
privatization in Kosovo began with a one decade delay than in the rest of Central and Eastern
Europe and went ahead at slower pace, in part due to disagreements by the international
community and Russia’a veto in the UN Security Council. After three proposals for ownership
transformation and privatization, the process finally got underway in 2002 (Mulaj, 2005: 146149)
Russia’s influence to her neighboring states where Russians make a sizeable minority suits well
the idea of nationalism and nation-states in the Balkans, primarily the Serbs who may emerge
victorious along these lines. This is what the EU and the US have been concerned as it may
become a precedent for other European countries consisting of multi-ethnic societies.

2. METHODS
The aim for this study stems from the practical and theoretical reasons for Russian
influence in the Western Balkans and the US response during this period of Russian covert
operations in the region. The study was based on published materials about the Russian strategy
in the Balkans and uses qualitative methods, e.g. interviews with experts to determine the
Russian role in the region. This study has an empirical theoretical approach and the collected
material shows that a new era is beginning among the Great Powers in the Balkans (Metodieva,
2019: 14).

The US Ambassador to Berlin Richard Grenell's new initiative was a step forward from the
failed European diplomacy launched by the EU in 2010-11, led by the former EU diplomat
Frederica Mogherini, where more than 30 agreements were signed between Pristina and
Belgrade, and none was implemented. But this moment is a good case of Russia's return to the
Balkans through frozen conflicts such as Kosovo and Bosnia Herzegovina. Russia has a strong
diplomacy, managing to turn unresolved disputes into an instrument of the Russian game in the
Balkans (Jonsson, et al, 2018: 87).
A rivalry of external actors is likely to exacerbate the difficult state of regional trade and
the loss of fragile ethnic balance in the hottest interethnic parts of the region. Russian diplomatic
intervention for a new century-old agreement between Kosovo and Serbia, is the new Russian
leap in the phase of resumption of Euro-American dialogue (Samorukov, 2019: 11). According to
the material and findings, one of the main strategies of Russia in the Balkans remains that hybrid
strategy a mix of classical and intelligent Russian methods inherited from the time of communism
and perfected over the last two decades.

3. ANALYSIS
From the obtained analysis, we can argue that the Russian action has been present in the
Balkans and in Northern Macedonia. The main research question is as follows: Has there been
political and diplomatic intervention by Russia in the Western Balkans? The analysis of 20
interviews showed that the Russian hybrid strategy includes a series of actions in several key and
very sensitive areas where Moscow manages to meet Russian strategic objectives in the Balkan
region (Secrieru, 2019: 13). Figure below shows how this strategy operates.
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4. DISCUSSION
Moscow's tremendous influence on local and national politics, media and business circles
backed by the Russian Orthodox Church, poses a permanent threat to the region, and Moscow is
now able to provoke ethnic and religious tensions, block reforms by supporting radical nationalist
forces (Cohen 1994: 822). All these are driven by political, ethnic disputes and economic rivalry,
which Russia makes it with the strategy of "divide and rule" (Stronski & Himes, 2019: 4).
Russia stepped up its active measures in the region, applying more informal factors to its current
policy and use of intelligence. Russia has consistently used cyber tools to punish, hack and
misinform. Large-scale cyber-attacks have been carried out discreetly or as part of complex
hybrid operations in combination with other coercive means (Prier, 2017: 68).
With cyberattacks, Russia has been particularly effective in the arena of psychological
information, where Russian narratives have received considerable reinforcement through social
media. The field of psychological information is essential for reducing support for the European
Union and NATO in the region and understands the growing polarization between pro-EU and
pro-Russian factions (Vejvoda, 2017: 40).

5. PROJECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Russian hybrid strategy, cyber- attacks and espionage remain the main Russian tools in the
region. However, in the Western Balkans, disinformation has been Russia's most obvious target.
Strategic disinformation and communication have another impact that Russia uses for political
purposes. Disinformation and propaganda are carried out through a number of actors, including
Russian embassies, state, private media and hackers. U.S. has reacted very little with direct
means, even only through public diplomacy, funding of non-governmental organizations to
counter Russian propaganda in the Balkans. U.S. in the Balkans can’t so easily oppose the Russian
presence or Kremlin propaganda. The Russian battle is difficult. Therefore, it requires strong
players to face Russia in the Balkans.
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